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I.

Petitioner's eritieisn1 of <HlP i~olntt-d phase of the
court's opinion is unjustified.

II. Plaintiff's conduct n1ust be based on his actions,
rather than \Yhat he intended to do.
III. The petition for rehearing is not justified in that
the petition asks for a reargument of the same
matters argued in the original briefs.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FRANK SANT,
P lain.ti.ff and _..1 ppellant:

Case No.
7277

vs.

ORLANDO JESSE MILLER,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESjPONDENT'S ANSWER AND BRIEF TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant's petition for rehearing is in effect a
re-argument of the same matter presented in the original
briefs.
Petitioner has directed attention to one isolated
phrase of the decision and offers the criticism that the
court was not justified in concluding:
''Appellant did not observe the car that hit
him unless it was one of those which he had observed coming from the north. After crossing
the west railroad track, appellant looked t,o the
no~rth, sa.u' the car ooming, stopped for .from 3
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t.o 5 seconds iJn the maim trav-eled p·ortion of the
street arnd during this time, failed to watch the
movement of c·ars from the north."
The italicized portion is the part of which plaintiff complains.
We fail to see. any basis for petitioner's criticism.
The language of the court is based on plaintiff's testimony precisely as stat~d by him. This was all argued
in the original briefs, together with the entire transcript
of testimony. Rather than repeat plaintiff's testimony
here, we refer to his testimony quoted at pages 3, 4, 13,
14 and 15 of our original brief, and quote two or three of
the questions and answers to illustrate that plaintiff
either did not see defendant's car at all, or if he did, he
failed to make more than a glance, thereafter withdrawing his attention:

''I looked to my left to see where ·aur oomp~anions were. Now anyone can tell you about as
well from there as I can. That's where I wasjust a.s I turned and looked is where I w!a.~
struck.'' (Tr. 125) (Respondent's Brief p. 13)
Well, how far was the nearest car !rom you~
A. I. can't-when we started across I can't tell
you as to those cars that were back up there.
That would be guessing or worse than guessing. (Respondent's Brief p. 14)

'' Q.

Q. · Well, where was the other car, the next nearA.

est car to you then~
Well, I wouldn't - I don't didn't hav-e no
aause to estimat.e that distance, an)d I don't
know." (Respondent's Brief p. 15)
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The statement of the court in its opinion first above
quoted is not, "'"e submit, subject to the criticisn1 offered
by petitioner, but is a precise and accurate summary of
plaintiff's own evidence.
Such self-serving statement as that elicited by plaintiff's counsel fron1 his client referred to on p~age 3 of
petitioner's brief is not proof that plaintiff continued to
look and observed southbound traffic, or that he did anything more than make a casual glance. Plaintiff is quoted
by petitioner as saying:
''~Iy

wife, I had my arm thru hers and I
sa'v cars coming from the north and hesitated or
stopped just across the rails t,o see W'hat those
oars were going to d1o. ''
·
By this self-serving statement, plaintiff suggests the
necessity for looking and continuing to watch southbound cars, and then in the next breath, he testified how
he withdrew his att.ention to look for his companions.
Good intentions are not sufficient under the law. Plaintiff's actions, as described by his own testimony, show
what he did do rather than what he intended to do. Had
plaintiff been looking, he would have observed the ap-proach of defendant's car. He admittedly withdrew his
attention.
That plaintiff's conduct must be charged by what
he in fact did do, rather than by what he may have intended to do is illustrated in the case of Gudielsly v. Bone,
23 Atl. (2d) 694, referred to on page 10 of petitioner's
hrief. In that case, there was a two-car collision in3
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volving a car driven by plaintiff in making a left turn
at the intersection in front of defendant's truck one
hundred twenty~three feet away.. The court directed
a verdict for defendant based upon plaintiff's admissions
that he crossed the intersection when defendant's truck
was only one hundred twenty-three feet to his right. In
quoting from Askin v. L-ang, 176 Md. 545, 6 Atl. (2d)
246, at ~page 249, the court pointed out that the right of
way rule was designed to prevent collisions and accidents; that plaintiff's care and caution, being the unfavored driver ••must be ·de.t~ermined by the facts and
not by the mere assertion that he was careful, but by
what he did to guard against and prevent collision with
favored traffic.'' Further said the court:
''Our conclusion from the record is that the
plaintiff was not without blame, and that his
carelessness and obliviousness of what was going
on at the intersection were contributing causes,
and that the defendant's prayer for a directed
verdict on the ground of contributory negligence
should have been granted."
In the citation of authorities, petitioner has likewise
substantially reargued the same matters argued to the
court in the original briefs. In simply quoting fron1
headnotes, he invokes general rules and principles without application to the particular facts.
He again argues (See pages 7 and 9 of Petitioner'~
Brief) that "plaintiff cannot be charged with negligence because he failed to anticipate defendant's failure
or negligence.''
4
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\Y·e did not, nor do \Ye no"· ~uhnit defPndant's negligence, but \vhether defendant \Ya~ n~gligent or not negligent, plaintiff \vhile violating the la,v-, both State and
City statutes and ordinances. and not hirnself in the
exercise of reasonable care cannot avoid the effect of
his own contributory negligence, \Yhich proximately
caused or contributed to his injuries. See Divita v .
..:l.tlantic Truck Co., C\V·. \ . . a.) 40 S. E. (2d) 325, (.page 19
of our original brief). To further illustrate, we also
quote the language of the court taken from McPherson
v. W aUing, et al, (Cal.) 209 Pac. 209, which case was
cited by petitioner at page 10 of his petition for rehearIng. Said the court:
'' . A.t least one who is himself violating that
act must then proceed with such caution as to
avoid another vehicle, whether its driver discharges its duty or not. If he fails to do so,
and is injured through a collision and his own
negligent violation of the law is a proximate contributing cause, he cannot recover; his contributory negligence will bar his right of action; under
such circumstances he has no right to assume that
the other driver would not be negligent and would
discharge his duty.''

Plaintiff's arguments as to defendant's negligence do not
relieve plaintiff from exercising due care.
The additional cases cited by petitioner ar·e distinguishable from the instant case. In Lutz v. City of Scra;n~
ton, 13 Atl. (2d) 121, (page 14 of petitioner's brief),
plaintiff fell on a defective step. It was slightly dark and
there had been nothing to warn plaintiff of the defect.

5
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In Kirk v. Los Angeles R. Corp., (Cal) 161 Pac. (2d)
673, (page 14 of petitioner's brief) plaintiff, a pedestrian,
was struck by a street car while crossing at an intersection and in a pedestrian lane on a green light which
changed while she was in the process of crossing. There
was evidence the street car started up before the signal
changed.
In Peac.ock v. Curf)is, 186 S. E. 13, 166 Va. 550 (page
9 of petitioner's brief) and K ermelly v. W aropajack, 109
Atl. 608, defendant's vehicle was the only one upon the
street. In the latter case plaintiff had reached a place
which would have been a place of safety. Defendant's ice
truck, which was not then in view, suddenly turned a corner running over plaintiff's foot.
Wil~iam

Est. Co. v. Nevada Wonder Co., 196 Pac.

884, (pag~e 10 of petitioner's brief) was a case oftrespass
of animals on private lands.

Reference to such general authorities is of little use
when each case must he decided under the particular facts
involved.
We do not understand or appreciate the wholly uncalled-for and unfounded comment of couns~el at page 20
of his brief wherein he refers to private audiences with
the court, as any inference that counsel for the defense
sought to gain private audience is entirely without any
foundation. In fairness to Mr. Sjostron1, we assume the
comment was not so intended to infer.
6
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CONCLlTSION

The one isolated se-ntence of the eourt 's opinion complained of in this case, 'Ye submit \Yas not only a correct
statement of fact, but 'Yas based on plaintiff's own testimonv and evidence and the criticism offered in the form
of a petition for rehearing is not justified.
.A. rehearing in this case 'vould only constitute a reargument and rehearing of the srune questions already
argued and presented to the court and ably outlined and
stated by the court in the unanimous decision concurred
in by all members of this court. That rehearings are not
JUstified under such circumstances is well explained in
Cummings v. Ni,elson, 42 Utah 15.7, 129 Pac. 619, and
Beaver C~ounty v. Home IndeJmnity Compa;n.y, 88 Utah 1,
52 Pac. (2d) 435.
oi

Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
E. F. BALDWIN, JR.
Attorneys fo.r Defendomt
and Respondent
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